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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 170.— O ctober T erm , 1923.

J. Harold Lehmann, Plaintiff in
In Error to the Supreme
Error,
Court of the State of
vs
Alabama.
State Board o f Public Accountancy
et al.
[December 10, 1923.]
Mr. Justice M cK e n n a delivered the opinion of the Court.
B y a statute o f the State, a board denominated the Board of
Pubic Accountancy was created. The Board has authority to
examine applicants for certificates or licenses to practice the busi
ness or calling of public accountant and to issue certificates to
those whom the Board deems qualified.
The Board is given power to cancel the certificate granted “ for
any unprofessional conduct o f the holder of such certificate, or
for other sufficient cause” upon written notice of 20 days and a
hearing thereon. The defendants in error, Alvidge, Edson and
R osson constitute the Board.
Complaint was made against plaintiff in error by the other de
fendants in error who are public accountants, a day set for hearing
and notice thereof given to plaintiff in error as required by the
statute.
He appeared at the time appointed but subsequently brought
this suit praying that the Board and its members be enjoined and
restrained from hearing the charges preferred against him, or from
making or entering any order revoking or attempting to revoke the
certificate issued to him, or from interfering in any way with the
practice of his profession as such certified public accountant. It
was also prayed that the other defendants in error be enjoined
from prosecuting the charges that they had preferred.
A temporary restraining order was issued and an order to show
cause why it should not be made permanent.
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The bill was dismissed on demurrer for want of equity and on
appeal to the Supreme Court the decree was affirmed. The Chief
Justice of the Court then granted this writ of error.
The ground of it and the reliance here is, expressed in several
ways, that the statute of the State is in conflict with the Consti
tution of the State and also in conflict with the Constitution of
the United States, the latter in that it, the statute, deprives plain
tiff in error of his property without due process of law, and sub
jects him to an ex post facto law.
The bill is very long. Its important facts are as follow s: Plain
tiff in error had “ by experience and assiduous attention to his
duties built up a large and lucrative business. ’’ Upon the appoint
ment o f the Board he applied for, and was issued a certificate after
standing the tests and examinations prescribed, and since that time
he has been practicing his profession as a certified public ac
countant.
The Board has never adopted any code or promulgated any
rules or definition of what is or is not professional conduct, or
what is sufficient cause for the revocation of a certificate.
He appeared before, the Board at the day appointed for
the hearing o f the charges against him and was informed by the
Board that there were no rules in effect to govern or control the
hearing, and evidence would be received with some liberality. The
hearing was continued until January 26, 1922, and plaintiff in
error notified to be back on that day for the purpose of being
tried.
It is nowhere averred in the charges against him that any
thing that he had done was wrongful or unlawful, the only alle
gation being that the alleged acts complained of were surrepti
tious.
The acts are enumerated and it is expressly denied that he was
guilty of anything wrongful, surreptitious or unlawful.
It is further averred that the Board has prejudged his acts, and
that the determination by the Board as to whether his certificate
should be revoked rests wholly within the arbitrary, uncontrolled
and unappealable judgment of the Board.
The unconstitutionality of the A ct is averred both under the
State and Federal Constitutions.
The contention that the statute and the powers it confers upon
the Board and the manner o f their exercise are in derogation of
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the Constitution of the State is decisively decided against by the
opinion o f the Supreme Court o f the State and, we may say, that
there is persuasion in the reasoning of the court against the con
tention that the statute is in conflict with the Constitution of the
United States. That is, that the statute is in effect an ex post
facto law or, if enforced against him, will deprive him of his prop
erty without due process o f law.
The opinion o f the court sustained the Board, its- powers, and
the manner of executing them, but refrained from expressing an
opinion o f the right or remedy o f plaintiff in error. It said, “ It
is not necessary or proper for this court to now decide what remedy,
if any, would be available to the appellant [plaintiff in error], if
his certificate or license should be improperly or illegally revoked or
cancelled.” In other words, the court declined to anticipate the
action of the Board; it decided only that if the State had the
power to confer a certificate on the plaintiff in error through the
Board, it had the power, through the Board, to take it away or
to prescribe the terms and conditions upon which it might be for
feited. And the court further said that the appeal was without
equity, since neither the trial court nor it could know in advance
of the hearing that the Board would sustain the charge.
The reasoning is conclusive. The procurement of a certificate
was deemed of value by plaintiff in error.
It was the con
firmation of his reputation, giving to it the sanction of an official
investigation and judgment. He knew the condition o f its issue,
knew that the conduct that secured it was a condition of its re
tention, that for inconstancy o f merit it could be forfeited. And
forfeited if it had been improvidently granted or procured by con
cealment or deception. And necessarily so, or the certificate would
be a means o f pretense.
Plaintiff in error puts some stress upon the absence of rules by
the Board urging that the statute is in conflict with the Constitu
tion of the United States because it purports to authorize the re
vocation of a certificate “ without defining or determining in ad
vance what grounds or facts or acts shall be sufficient cause for
such revocation.” Such absence permits, it is asserted, arbitrary
action. W e cannot yield to that assertion or assume that the Board
will be impelled to action by other than a sense of duty or render
judgment except upon convincing evidence introduced in a regu
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lar way with opportunity of rebuttal. We certainly cannot restrain
the Board upon the possibility of contrary action. Official bodies
would be o f no use as instruments of government if they could be
prevented from action by the supposition of wrongful action.
This Court and other courts have decided that a license or
certificate may be required of a physician, surgeon, dentist, lawyer
or school teacher. Douglas v. Noble, 261 U. S. 165, has pertinent
comment upon the power of the legislature in that regard. The
Supreme Court in the present case construed the statute as not
so exacting of public accountants. In other words, it was decided
that the indicated professions require a license or certificate but
that a public accountant requires none. And it was decided that
a public accountant gets no right of business from the grant of a
certificate; he loses no right of business by its cancellation.
The statute is not, nor are the proceedings before the Board,
such as plaintiff in error conceives them. The cases he cites are,
therefore, not pertinent and need no review.*
The motion to affirm must be granted.
So ordered.
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